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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Marjory Ann Barnes appeals from the district court's order denying her
petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts underlying Barnes'
criminal convictions as follows:
Following a report of concerns that Barnes and her
boyfriend,
Gregory
Klundt,fFNJ
were
manufacturing
methamphetamine in their shared residence, law enforcement
obtained a warrant to search their house. The search revealed a
number of items associated with the manufacture of
methamphetamine. The state charged Barnes with conspiracy to
traffic in methamphetamine by manufacture, I.C. §§ 37-2732B(a)(3)
and 18-204; trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture, I.C.
§§ 37-2732B(a)(3) and 18-204; and possession of a controlled
substance, pseudoephedrine, with intent to manufacture
methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). After trial, a jury found
Barnes guilty. Barnes was sentenced to concurrent determinate
terms of five years for each count.
FN Klundt was also charged with the same crimes.
The district court joined Barnes's and Klundt's cases
for trial. However, the cases were not consolidated
on appeal.
State v. Barnes, Docket No. 37995, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 305S at p.2
(Idaho App. May 4, 2012). 1 "Barnes was also found guilty of manufacture of a

1

Pursuant to Barnes' motion, the Idaho Supreme Court has entered an order
taking judicial notice of the following transcripts from Barnes' criminal case: (1)
suppression hearing held on March 18, 201 O; (2) the opening and closing
statements from the jury trial; (3) the jury trial; and (4) the sentencing hearing
held on July 29, 2010. (Order Granting Motion to Take Judicial Notice, dated
February 25, 2013.) The Court has not taken judicial notice of the Clerk's Record
or exhibits from Barnes' criminal case. (See id.)
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controlled substance where a child is present, I.C. § 37-2737A, and was
sentenced to a consecutive indeterminate two-year term." ~ at p.2 n.2.
In her criminal case, Barnes was originally represented by John Redal,
who also represented Klundt. (R., p.100.) ''The joint representation continued
through the motion to suppress which was made on behalf of both defendants
and which was denied." (R., p.100.) "Following the decision on the motion to
suppress Redal withdrew as Barnes' attorney and Michael Palmer was appointed
to represent her." (R., p.100.) Palmer appeared on May 7, 2010, and the trial
began on May 25, 2010. (R., p.100.) As noted, a jury convicted Barnes of the
charged offenses. Barnes' convictions were affirmed on appeal. Barnes, supra.
While her appeal was pending, Barnes filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief alleging numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
against both Redal and Palmer and one claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (R.,
pp.5-9.) Barnes' petition included a request for counsel, which the court granted.

(R., pp.8, 11.)
The state filed an answer and a motion for summary disposition after
which post-conviction counsel filed an amended petition again alleging several
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and a misconduct claim. (R., pp.13-16,
19-23.) The state filed an answer to the amended petition and Barnes filed a
response to the state's initial motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.28-33.) The
state filed a reply, seeking summary dismissal of Barnes' claims with the
exception of three ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which the state
"concede[d] ... should be resolved by evidentiary hearing." (R., pp·. 34-35, 39-
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40.)
The court held a hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal after
which the court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the following claims:

(1)

"Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to communicate"; (2) "Ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to advise [Barnes] of her rights"; (3) "Ineffective
assistance of counsel for preventing [Barnes] from presenting her defense";" (4)
"Ineffective assistance of counsel by ... engaging in representation of [Barnes]
while under a conflict of interest"; and (5) "Ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to adequately prepare for [Barnes'] defense at trial." (R., pp.21, 42; see
generally Tr., pp.10-20.) Barnes withdrew the remaining claims in her amended
petition and they were dismissed. (R., p.42.)
After the evidentiary hearing, the court entered an order denying relief and
a judgment dismissing Barnes' petition. (R., pp.99-113.) Barnes filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp.115-116.)
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ISSUE
Barnes states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred when it denied post conviction relief after
an evidentiary hearing, rejecting Petitioner's assertion that she had
received ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest
arising from her attorney's concurrent representation of a co-defendant?
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Barnes failed to show error in the district court's denial of her petition
for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing?

4

ARGUMENT

Barnes Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court's Denial Of Her Petition
For Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing
A.

Introduction
Although Barnes alleged a number of claims in her amended petition, all

of which were dismissed, on appeal she only challenges dismissal of one of
those claims. Specifically, Barnes "is only pursuing the main conflict of interest
claim in this appeal." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) With respect to that claim, Barnes
contends the district court erred in denying relief because, she argues, Redal had
an actual conflict of interest during the period of time he represented both her
and her co-defendant, and, as a result, he failed to advise her to plead guilty.
(Appellant's Brief, p .16.) Barnes' claim fails because there is no evidence that
Redal actively represented conflicting interests much less that she was
prejudiced as a result of any alleged conflict. To the contrary, the record shows
that Redal acted to avoid a potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, Barnes has
failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of her conflict of interest claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil

proceedings in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho
567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834,
838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)).
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters
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findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of
law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998).

A trial court's decision that a post-

conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight.
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990).
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony,
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the
province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108,
110 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

Barnes Failed To Meet Her Burden Of Establishing She Was Entitled To
Post-Conviction Relief Based On An Alleged Conflict Of Interest
"Joint representation of defendants is not per se ineffective assistance of

counsel." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511, 988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999)
(citation omitted). Rather, a defendant seeking relief based on an alleged conflict
of interest, to which she did not object at trial, must demonstrate that counsel
"actively represented conflicting interests" and that the conflict of interest actually
affected the adequacy of the lawyer's performance. Hairston, 133 Idaho at 511,
988 P.2d at 1185; see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (where
defendant

alleges

a

conflict

based

upon

his

counsel's

simultaneous

representation of defendant and the prosecutor's key witness, defendant must
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance); State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423 (2009)
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("Whether a trial court's failure to adequately inquiry, but the defendant did not
object to the conflict at trial, the defendant's conviction will only be reversed if he
or she can prove that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance.")

An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel, not by

whether there is a "mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens v. Taylor, 535
U.S. 162, 171, 172 n.5 (2002).

"[T]he possibility of conflict is insufficient to

impugn a criminal conviction." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 62, 106 P.3d 376,
388 (2004) (citations omitted).

Absent such a showing, a defendant is not

entitled to reversal of her conviction.

Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173-74; Burger v.

Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987).
At the evidentiary hearing, Redal testified there are circumstances in
which he has been asked to represent two people charged with the same or
similar offenses. (Tr., p.27, L.20 - p.28, L.10.) In those cases, Redal "inform[s]
the clients of the potential conflicts and things that could arise." (Tr., p.28, Ls.1820.) Redal elaborated:
I generally [inform them] in a verbal conversation because,
when that issue comes up, you obviously see the issue when
they're both sitting in your office because they're asking you to
represent both of them. So you generally go over -- the main one
that I always go over is it could become a problem if the State were
to ask one of you, ''I'll dismiss your case if you agree to testify
against the other party." And then I said that seriously creates a
conflict. And if something like that ever were to happen, then I
always -- I inform the client that I probably would not represent both
of them after that offer had been made.
(Tr., p.28, L.22 - p.29, L.8.)
Redal testified that although he did not specifically recall discussing the
potential conflict issue with Barnes and Klundt, he believed he did because "that
7

would be a standard thing that [he] would do." (Tr., p.29, L.16 - p.30, L.13.)
Redal explained that he ultimately withdrew from representing Barnes after
concluding he "should only continue to represent one of them because it was
clear the case was going to be going to trial." (Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.31, L.6.) Redal
further explained:
And given the nature of the case, oftentimes when you get ready
for something like that, you can point the finger at the other party
and blame them since they were both there, and one of them
would. And I believe at that time Gregory Klundt was still in
custody and [Barnes] was out. And we talked about that, and
[Barnes] felt that it was best for her to go to the public defender's
office.
(Tr., p.31, Ls.6-14.) Redal, therefore, withdrew from Barnes' representation and
Palmer was appointed to represent her with Redal continuing to represent
Klundt. (Tr., p.31, Ls.15-16; see R., p.100.)
Redal's testimony demonstrates his representation was entirely consistent
with his obligations under the Sixth Amendment. Redal represented both Barnes
and Klundt through the suppression hearing and there is no evidence that their
interests were inconsistent up to that point. In fact, Redal testified that he did not
believe his dual representation "impacted" either Barnes or Klundt and that, if he
"would have thought that, [he] would have withdrawn." (Tr., p.34, Ls.8-14.) It is
well-established that a court may rely on counsel's statements regarding the
existence of a conflict.

Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346-47 ("Absent special

circumstances,

trial

therefore,

courts

may assume

either that

multiple

representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly
accept such risk of conflict as may exist."); State
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V;

Koch, 116 Idaho 571, 574,

777 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Ct. App. 1989) ("When neither the defendant nor his
lawyer objects to concurrent representation of a co-defendant, the trial court
generally is entitled to assume that no conflict exists or that the defendant
knowingly has accepted such a risk.").
With respect to Redal's joint representation, the district court found : "No
facts were presented by Barnes to show that in connection with the suppression
hearing her interests were different from those of Klundt or that Redal failed to
present facts or arguments on her behalf at the suppression hearing."

(R.,

p.108.) Barnes does not challenge the court's finding in this regard, but instead
criticizes the court's statement, arguing the court "seems to misunderstand the
claim." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Barnes perceives a misunderstanding because
she contends:
The point is not that the co-defendants had different interests at the
suppression hearing or that Redal failed to do something at the
suppression hearing due to the conflict. Rather, the point is that
throughout the joint representation the co-defendants had different
interests and the attorney's ability to act in the best interest of Ms.
Barnes was inhibited by the attorney's duties to Mr. Klundt.
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

According to Barnes, she and Klundt had divergent

interests because, she claims, she was less culpable than Klundt and it was in
her "best interest" to "enter into an early plea bargain in the case which would
avoid the 5 year mandatory minimum sentence and/or the two year mandatory
consecutive sentence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15.) Barnes' arguments fail for
at least two reasons.
First, Barnes is incorrect in her assertion that the court's finding regarding
the lack of any evidence of a conflict in relation to the suppression hearing is
9

irrelevant.

Barnes' failure to present any evidence that Redal actively

represented conflicting interests in the context of the suppression hearing
demonstrates the absence of any actual conflict during the period of joint
representation.

In the end, Redal did precisely what he should have.

Upon

realizing that the case was going to trial, and that Barnes may want to "point the
finger" at Klundt, he advised her to get a different attorney. (Tr., p.31, Ls.3-14.)
As a result, Barnes got precisely the remedy she would have been entitled to at
the time had an actual conflict existed. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475
(1978).
Second, Barnes' argument is predicated on a theoretical conflict that is
unsupported by any evidence, rather than actual conflict, which she was required
to prove. Barnes suggests that if Redal had not jointly represented both her and
Klundt prior to trial, Redal would or should have secured a plea agreement for
her. Barnes, however, presented no evidence of such. She did not elicit any
testimony from Redal on this point, nor did she elicit any testimony from Palmer
that there was a plea offer she could have taken. (See generally Tr., pp.35-40,
64-94.) If anything, Barnes' testimony that neither Redal nor Palmer discussed
"an offer of settlement" demonstrates no such offer existed to discuss, which
testimony was consistent with Redal's testimony that if he represented codefendants and an offer was made to one, he "would not represent both of them
after that offer had been made." (Tr., p.29, Ls.1-8; p.102, Ls.11-13.)
Because Barnes failed to meet her burden of showing an actual conflict of
interest, much less that Redal's performance was adversely affected by an actual
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conflict of interest, she has failed to show error in the dismissal of her postconviction petition and her conflict of interest claim.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
judgment dismissing Barnes' petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this

?1h day of May 2013.
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of May 2013, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
GREG SILVEY
Attorney at Law
PO Box 565
Star, Idaho 83669

JE~SICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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